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The year 2005 might just go down in history as The Year
Nature Struck Back. Earthquakes kill more than 50,000 in
Pakistan and Kashmir (proving how stupid it is for people to
fight one another when sooner or later they will need each
other). More than 1,000 die in hurricane-spawned floods in
Mississippi and Louisiana (exposing the sorry state of both
the infrastructure and the emergency response system in the
US). Eight straight days of rain dump a foot of water on New
England, weakening ancient dams (there’s that infrastruc-
ture problem again) and threatening numerous towns with
severe flooding. And as I write this the 21st tropical storm of
the Atlantic season, Wilma, is churning up the waters of the
Caribbean, with a projected path towards Florida via the bat-
tered Gulf of Mexico. Wilma is also the 12th hurricane of this
season, tying a record set in 1969 (the 21 tropical storms also
tie a record, set in 1933).  
How bad has it been this year? Well, we’re about to run out of
letters of the alphabet: tropical storms are named alphabeti-
cally each year, with boy’s and girl’s names alternating (it
used to be only girl’s names until someone suggested that this
seemed a tad misogynist, as in fact it was). For some reason
the letters Q, U, X, Y and Z are not used (no hurricane Quasi-
modo, Ursula, Xavier, Yves or tropical storm Zorro), so if
more than 21 storms occur - and they might well; the storm
season doesn’t officially end until November 30 - the Greek
alphabet will be used, starting with Alpha. That hasn’t hap-
pened since they started keeping records in 1851. 
But of all the natural disasters, actual or potential, that beset
us this year, the one that seems to terrify people the most is
the possibility of a flu pandemic. The H5N1 influenza strain,
first identified in Asia (where it has killed 65 of the 117
people known to have been infected by it since 2003, 44 of
them in Vietnam), has now turned up in dead birds in
Turkey and Romania, and probably in Greece as well,
although that hadn’t been confirmed when this article was
being written. These latest findings lay to rest a long-stand-
ing argument about whether influenza outbreaks that start
in domestic poultry can become a pandemic by the agency of
migratory birds. Obviously, they can. And that is something
to be very concerned about, as I’ll explain in a minute. Nor-
mally, I don’t get too worked up over widely publicized
threats. The fact that everybody is worried about something
makes it much less likely, in my experience, that things will
turn out as badly as feared (remember the ‘Y2K’ computer
bug?). It’s the unexpected that usually produces the greatest
consequences. So, since everybody is so worried about the
possibility of a pandemic of influenza, doesn’t that mean,
ipso facto, that I’m not that worried? Unfortunately, it
doesn’t. Not in this case. I’m afraid an influenza pandemic is
very much something to worry about.  
The term pandemic refers to an outbreak of a disease that
spreads over huge areas. Fortunately, there have been rela-
tively few in recent history, largely because increased scien-
tific understanding of the causes of disease has led to
improved public health policies. But funding for public
health is in decline in most countries, including the US, and
it is worth recalling that there have been a number of pan-
demics in the past 100 years (starting with the great
influenza pandemic of 1918), and nearly all have been out-
breaks of flu. Major flu strains are named for the particular
alleles of the two major viral coat proteins they contain. The
outer shell of the membrane-enveloped influenza virus is
studded with spikes of a sugar-binding protein called
hemagglutinin (the ‘H’ in the strain designation) that is
involved in target-cell recognition and fusion of the viral
membrane with that of the cell, and a sugar-hydrolyzing
enzyme called neuraminidase (the ‘N’). Hemagglutinin
seems to tolerate more mutational variability than does neu-
raminidase: there are about 15 different strain types of
hemagglutinin and 9 of neuraminidase, making at least 135
potential major viral strains. Some infect birds; others infect
pigs; still others, people, and so on. H5N1, which has hemag-
glutinin type 5 combined with neuraminidase type 1, is pri-
marily an avian virus. It is particularly virulent for poultry,
and has a high capacity for genetic change, both by singlemutations and by recombination with the genetic material of
other flu strains. 
The history of the H5N1 strain tells us a lot about the way flu
works. It also tells us a lot about the responses of people and
governments to it. The strain was known as a purely bird flu
for decades, but in 1997 it passed from chickens to humans
in Hong Kong, causing the death of 6 people out of 18
infected and leading to the destruction of some million
chickens. That radical action squelched the epidemic, and it
also taught scientists that the high avian virulence of H5N1
also applied to humans. Late in 2003 and early in 2004, out-
breaks of H5N1 occurred in poultry farms in Cambodia,
China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, South Korea, Thailand and
Vietnam. In February 2004, the strain was detected in pigs
in Vietnam, showing that it had acquired the ability to infect
non-human mammals. Fresh outbreaks occurred in China in
July of that same year and in Malaysia in August. Omi-
nously, also in August the first cases of human infection
were reported in Vietnam and Thailand. These were almost
exclusively poultry farmers. As had been the case in the 1997
Hong Kong outbreak, the mortality rate among infected
humans was very high. In January of this year a major out-
break occurred among poultry in Vietnam: 33 of the 64 cities
and provinces were affected. In an attempt to contain the
epidemic, 1.2 million poultry were slaughtered. It is esti-
mated that over 100 million birds died of the disease.  
In May, it became clear that H5N1 had started to spread
beyond southeast Asia. Migratory waterfowl began dying
from the disease at Quinghai Lake Nature Reserve in
Western China. Storks, geese and gulls are known reservoirs
of avian flu virus but they rarely become ill from it. This
variant of H5N1 was apparently even more virulent than
usual. Public health officials became alarmed, because in the
fall there are mass bird migrations from Asia to Africa, by
way of Russia and Turkey. In July, the first human fatality in
Indonesia was reported. In August, the virus was confirmed
in birds in Mongolia and Kazakhstan; by the end of the
month, it had spread to south-western Russia. In September,
the United Nations health representative who would coordi-
nate a worldwide response to a pandemic, David Nabarro,
estimated that a pandemic among humans could kill up to
150 million people worldwide. And last month, analysis of
dead birds in Turkey and Romania confirmed that H5N1 had
reached continental Europe.
Simultaneously, a team from The Institute for Genome
Research (TIGR) reported the complete sequence of 207
H3N2 isolates and two H1N2 isolates, giving the first com-
prehensive picture of influenza virus evolution (Ghedin et
al.:  Nature 2005,  437:1162-1166). They observed point
mutations, deletions and segmental exchanges. Their most
dramatic finding is the discovery of an epidemiologically sig-
nificant reassortment that explains the appearance, during
the 2003-2004 season, of the ‘Fujian/411/2002’-like strain,
for which existing vaccines had limited effectiveness. They
conclude “not only that the influenza virus population con-
tains multiple lineages at any given time, but also that alter-
nate, minor lineages can contribute genetic variation to the
dominant lineage, resulting in epidemiologically significant,
antigenically novel strains.”
The best example of what an “antigenically novel strain” can
do to the world is the great ‘Spanish flu’ pandemic of 1918.
No one knows exactly how many people died that year,
worldwide, but the estimates range from 20 to 50 million,
making the 1918 flu the deadliest single epidemic in world
history. (More people may have died from the Black Death of
the 13th century, but that was actually a series of epidemics
stretching over decades. It killed a third of Europe, but
spared most of the rest of the world. The 1918 ‘Spanish’ flu
hit almost every continent.)
It’s funny about that 1918 pandemic. When I was a boy no
one talked about it, even though there were plenty of people
alive who had been through it. No books or newspaper arti-
cles were written about it, and every flu season didn’t begin
with panicky reminders of that devastating autumn. The
1918 flu spread around the globe in just a few months - in an
era before regular airplane travel. It killed more young
people than old people. On one day alone, October 10, it
killed 342 people in New York and 514 in Philadelphia. It
killed so many people in Boston that they ran out of coffins.
It killed with alarming quickness, a trait not seen before in
influenza epidemics. Religious folk thought the world was
coming to an end. It was followed by an even more mysteri-
ous disease, an epidemic of sleeping sickness, encephalitis
lethargica. Over a fifteen year period, 5 million people
around the world came down with this malady. A third died
quickly; one third never recovered, remaining virtually
comatose for the rest of their lives. A bright young British
pianist, Philip Leather, age 13, came down with encephalitis
lethargica in 1933 and was admitted to the Royal London
Hospital in Whitechapel. He never left, dying there on
December 15, 2002, age 82, the last known survivor of the
strangest epidemic in history. He, the disease that destroyed
his life, and the flu pandemic that preceded it were all but
forgotten until recent years. They’ve been rediscovered now,
in part because scare stories about emerging diseases sell
books and newspapers, and there’s an appetite among the
reading public for history that seems relevant to our times. 
And there’s another reason it makes a lot of sense to be
thinking about the 1918 pandemic these days. In a remark-
able feat of forensic genomics, teams of scientists have suc-
ceeded in genome sequencing (Taubenberger et al.: Nature
2005, 437:889-893), and then reconstructing (Tumpey et
al.: Science 2005, 310:77-80) the influenza virus strain that
caused the ‘Spanish’ flu. Their work shows that it was
unquestionably an avian virus. But it wasn’t, as people
thought for years, the strain called H1N1. It appears to have
121.2 Genome Biology 2005, Volume 6, Issue 11, Article 121 Petsko  http://genomebiology.com/2005/6/11/121
Genome Biology 2005, 6:121been a variant of H5N1. The 1918 pandemic virus genome
was reassembled from fragments recovered from preserved
tissues from 1918 victims. The reconstructed virus is as
lethal as feared; it kills mice more quickly than any other
human flu virus known. Three genes appear to be the chief
contributors to its virulence: the hemagglutinin is unusually
potent in latching onto the surface of cells; the virus doesn’t
need to rely on its host cells for the protease trypsin to cleave
and activate the hemagglutinin - the neuraminidase appears
to do that. (This may be why the 1918 virus, like some highly
virulent bird flu strains, can grow in any cell type, not just
trypsin-containing lung cells.) And finally, the 1918 strain has
polymerase genes that allow it to replicate very efficiently in
human bronchial cells. The polymerase genes are similar to
those found in bird flu, including H5N1 in Asia, so the
researchers conclude that the 1918 flu probably arose directly
from a bird virus without combining with a flu strain already
adapted to humans, unlike the strains that caused the much
less lethal 1957 and 1968 flu pandemics. For example, there
are only 10 amino acid positions (out of 2,232 total codons)
that consistently distinguish the 1918 polymerase proteins
(and those of other strains that infect humans) from their
avian influenza counterparts. The present H5N1 strain
making its way out of Asia already has some of the mutations
it needs to look a lot like the 1918 strain. The rest could accu-
mulate over time, but it would probably take quite a while.
What is worrying public health officials is the possibility that,
since influenza can also evolve through genetic rearrange-
ment, time may be about to run out. 
Currently, in humans, H5N1 has an extremely high mortality
rate but a very low rate of bird-to-human infectivity and, as
far as is known, a zero rate of human-to-human transmis-
sion - yet. It’s the ‘yet’ that has everyone in a sweat, because
the way avian flu strains were thought to acquire that capa-
bility is when they infect a mammal (a pig, say, or a person)
that is also infected with a more human-like flu virus, and
the two strains exchange genetic material, just the sort of
recombination event the TIGR team describes. So the
current efforts of public health officials to contain the virus
are focused on culling flocks that contain infected fowl so
that the probability of human infection is kept extremely
low. That strategy will probably work in Europe, and maybe
even in the Middle East, but the migratory birds that are
now spreading this disease aren’t planning to spend the
winter in Nice, as attractive as that location may be: they’re
heading for East Africa. That’s right, the same East Africa
that is so beset by famine and war that two things seem
certain: one, that no one there is going to kill domestic fowl
herds en masse - food sources are just too valuable; and two,
the local public health infrastructure is not likely to be able
to prevent simultaneous infection of mammals with both
avian and human viruses. 
That’s one reason there is such a fuss about the flu drugs
oseltamivir (Tamiflu, by Roche) and zanimivir (Relenza, by
GlaxoSmithKline). These are a new class of antiviral com-
pounds that work by inhibiting the neuraminidase. They are
also among the first structure-based pharmaceuticals ever
developed. They are the brainchild of an Australian named
Graeme Laver, who works at the John Curtin National Uni-
versity in Canberra, Australia. He was one of the scientists
who showed that the 1968 pandemic was caused by a virus
that arose through genetic reassortment. Realizing that the
best target for an antiviral drug should be an enzyme, he set
out to determine the crystal structure of the neuraminidase
in 1978. He couldn’t get any major pharmaceutical company
interested in his crystals so he took them to a young protein
crystallographer at CSIRO in Melbourne named Peter
Colman. Colman solved the structure in 1982. It made the
cover of Nature. The structure immediately revealed a highly
conserved cavity in the active site, a perfect target for drug
development. Starting with a compound developed years
before by two Viennese chemists that was a weak inhibitor,
Colman and Laver began to use a series of neuraminidase-
inhibitor crystal structures to produce an improved binder.
They did this through a small company they formed called
Biota, with the aid of chemist Mark von Itzstein. Once they
had their drug, they tried shopping it to big pharma again,
and again no one seemed interested. Finally Colman per-
suaded Glaxo to take a chance, and Relenza (Glaxo’s name
for zanimivir) was born. Once one major drug company
decided that influenza drugs were a good idea, the rest of the
pharmaceutical industry, with that creativity and daring that
characterizes it, jumped right in. Next past the post was
Roche, with a compound they called Tamiflu (oseltamivir,
originally designed by a small company, Gilead). 
Tamiflu is the major focus of drug stockpiling now, because
it can be given orally (Relenza must be taken as a powder in
inhaled form). In 1994, Fred Hayden of the University of
Virginia was the first person to give a neuraminidase
inhibitor (Relenza) to a human being. The clinical trial data
show that these drugs shortened the recovery time of
infected individuals by a couple of days, reduced the risk of
complications, and when taken prophylactically seemed to
protect against infection in many cases. Since they hit a
highly conserved target, there is every reason to believe that
they will work against most strains, including H5N1 variants,
but to date their effectiveness against the reconstructed 1918
strain has not been established as far as I know, and there is
too little experience with them in the field to know if resis-
tance to them can develop rapidly. Certainly it can develop: a
variant of H5N1 resistant to Tamiflu has just been discov-
ered in Vietnam (Le et al.: Nature 2005, 437:1108). Vaccine
development for flu, as well as for other viral scourges, is still
lagging way behind where it needs to be, making the neu-
raminidase inhibitors the front line defense against an H5N1
outbreak in a human population center. So, the fact that
people now seem to be buying and hoarding these drugs in a
panicky response to the scare stories about H5N1 is very
troubling. Indiscriminate use of the drugs by ordinary
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world get ‘ordinary’ flu every year, and all it might take
would be a few years of Tamiflu and Relenza use for such rel-
atively harmless flu cases to produce a reservoir of resistant
human virus. Resistant, and just waiting for a bird flu to
exchange genes with. 
So, for now the best thing for us to do is to wait, too. Wait,
and hope that the H5N1 virus doesn’t make it to East Africa.
Because if it does, we may look back on the events of 2005
wistfully. Which reminds me of a story: two businessmen are
sitting at lunch, bemoaning their lot. “What a time I’ve had,”
groans the first one. “Two years ago I lost $50,000; last year
I lost $100,000, and this year I lost $200,000.” “That’s
nothing,” says the second. “I spent a fortune sending my son
to medical school. When he finished, he decided he didn’t
want to be a doctor; he wanted to be a lawyer. So I spent
another fortune sending him to law school. Now that he’s
finished that, he says he doesn’t want to be a lawyer. He
wants to be a painter. What could be worse than that?” And
the first man says, “Next year.”
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